Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act: Congress, the Supreme Court, the SEC and the Process of Defining Insider Trading by Thel, Steve
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1991
Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act:
Congress, the Supreme Court, the SEC and the
Process of Defining Insider Trading
Steven Thel
Fordham University School of Law, sthel@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven Thel, Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act: Congress, the Supreme Court, the SEC and the Process of Defining Insider Trading,
69 N.C. L. Rev. 1261 (1991)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/832
SECTION 20(d) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT: CONGRESS, THE
SUPREME COURT, THE SEC, AND THE
PROCESS OF DEFINING INSIDER
TRADING
STEVE THEL*
A comment in a recent volume of the North Carolina Law Review analyzed
option traders' standing to recover under the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's rule lOb-51 for issuer misrepresentations and insider trading.2 Among
other things, the comment argued that corporate insiders should not trade stan-
dardized options on corporate securities while in possession of inside informa-
tion, and that when they do so trade they injure other option traders. The
comment suggested that option traders should have the same rights against cor-
porate insiders who trade options on corporate stock as people who trade the
underlying stock have against insiders who trade the stock. Specifically, the
comment concluded that a person who has traded standardized options on cor-
porate stock should have a private right of action against any corporate insider
who traded such options at the same time if the insider was in possession of
material, nonpublic corporate information. 3
This argument was based on certain forcefully stated principles of fairness
taken as fundamental and in keeping with the "metaphysical foundations" of the
federal securities laws.4 Anyone who accepts these premises probably would
agree that corporate insiders should be forbidden to trade options on corporate
stock while in possession of material, nonpublic corporate information and that
public option traders should have standing to challenge such trading. Most peo-
ple probably do accept these premises and most probably would object to corpo-
rate insiders' trading options on the basis of inside information. Not everyone
thinks insider trading is unfair, however, and even if insider trading in standard-
ized options is inappropriate, recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly
Chiarella v. United States,5 can be read to pose serious doctrinal obstacles to any
effective prohibition of such trading.
The comment dealt with the Chiarella problem at length,6 but it did not
consider the way the situation was changed by section 20(d) of the Securities
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
2. Comment, Options Traders, Rule 10b-5, and Standing: Making Sense of It All, 67 N.C.L.
Rnv. 1124 (1989).
3. Id. at 1139-48.
4. Id. at 1125.
5. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6. Comment, supra note 2, at 1138-39.
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Exchange Act of 1934,7 which was enacted as part of the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984 (Sanctions Act).8 Broadly speaking, section 20(d) puts insider
trading in a derivative instrument like a stock option on the same footing as
insider trading in the security underlying the derivative instrument. This effec-
tively makes it illegal for corporate insiders to trade options on the basis of non-
public inside information and gives option traders standing to sue insiders who
trade options illegally.9 In an important sense then, Congress agrees that insider
trading in stock options is objectionable and, perhaps more importantly, that
such trading is essentially the same as insider trading in stock. This Essay devel-
ops some of the implications of that agreement for the way the federal securities
laws are understood and applied.10
The term "insider trading" is not defined in the federal securities statutes,
but it often is used to refer generally to all trading by people who possess mate-
rial, nonpublic information. This definition encompasses not only corporate in-
siders' buying stock on the basis of nonpublic corporate information, but also
trading by people who are not affiliated with the issuers of the securities they
trade and trading motivated by relevant nonpublic information originating
outside the issuer.1 1 The House committee report on the Sanctions Act used the
term in this broad sense: "'Insider trading' is the term used to refer to trading
in the securities markets while in possession of 'material' information (generally,
information that would be important to an investor in making a decision to buy
or sell a security) that is not available to the general public." 12
Insider trading of this sort is not always illegal. 13 Specific instances of in-
sider trading, however, may run afoul of one or another of several provisions of
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1988). Section 20(d) provides:
Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in possession of,
material, nonpublic information would violate, or result in liability to any purchaser or
seller of the security under any provision of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereun-
der, such conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege with respect to such security or with respect to a group or index of securities
including such security, shall also violate and result in comparable liability to any pur-
chaser or seller of that security under such provision, rule, or regulation.
Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
9. See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-I (1988) (liability to con-
temporaneous traders for insider trading).
10. This Essay builds on Comment, supra note 2. More extensive discussion of the controlling
precedent and citation to the secondary literature can be found there. See also Friedman, The In-
sider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C.L. REv. 465 (1990) (describing
current law).
11. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEws 2274, 2277-78; see also Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
Support of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1982, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 355, supra, at 21
n.33 ("'Insider trading' is the term commonly used to describe the act of purchasing or selling
securities while in possession of material, nonpublic information about an issuer or the trading mar-
ket for an issuer's securities."), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2274, 2293;
Wang, The "Contemporaneous" Traders Who Can Sue an Inside Trader, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1175,
1175 n.2 (1987) (adopting a similar definition).
12. H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 11, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2274, 2275.
13. The term "insider trading" is sometimes restricted to illegal trading. See D. LANGEVOORT,
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 5 (1991).
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the federal securities laws, particularly rule lOb-5, t4 under which the well-publi-
cized crusade against insider trading has been mounted. 15 The operative scope
of rule lOb-5 is important, but hard to define. The rule does not speak to insider
trading directly, and it is framed in extremely broad terms. It is impossible to
say (succinctly or otherwise) just what rule 10b-5 requires or forbids, and it is
not always clear whether insider trading is illegal. Nonetheless, it is fairly clear
how the rule applies to the paradigm case from which the practice of trading on
the basis of nonpublic information gets its conventional name: it is a violation of
rule lOb-5 for a corporation's directors or senior officers to buy common stock of
the corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information acquired from
the corporation. Before Congress acted in 1984, however, it was not so clear
that insider trading in options was legally equivalent to insider trading in stock;
it may have been legal for insiders to trade options on corporate common stock
at the same time that it was illegal for them to trade the underlying common
stock directly.' 6
Any explanation of the positive law of insider trading must start with the
Supreme Court's 1980 opinion in Chiarella.17 Vincent Chiarella, a mark-up
man for a financial printer, was convicted of violating rule 10b-5 and section
10(b) of the Exchange Act' 8 after he profitably traded securities on the basis of
confidential information he uncovered during the course of his employment.' 9
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
15. See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 14(e), 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e), 78p (1988)
(establishing liability for untrue statements of material fact and omissions of facts with respect to
tender offers); rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990) (regulations surrounding transactions made
by directors, officers, and principal stockholders).
16. See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURrrIES REGULATION 680-82 (2d ed. 1990)
(discussing stock rights and options in the insider trading context); Crespi, Private Rights of Action
for Option Position Holders Under Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 21,
21-30 (1988) (discussing availability of private right of action for option holders under § 20(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act); Langevoort, Commentary: The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and
Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. Rnv. 1273, 1290-91 (1984) (outlining effect of Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 on trading options); Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical
Assessment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 965-66 (describing the
options market and its implications on insider trading); Thel, Closing a Loophole: Insider Trading in
Standardized Options, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 573-76 (1988) (addressing the applicability of
rule lOb-5 to close loopholes allowing corporate insiders to trade standardized options on corporate
stock when they cannot trade the stock itself); Wang, A Cause of Action for Option Traders Against
Insider Option Traders, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1056-60 (1988) [hereinafter Wang, A Cause of
Action] (outlining cause of action available for options traders under § 20(d) of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984); Wang, supra note 11, at 1187-91 (discussing whether a contemporaneous
trader must buy or sell a security or option with the same issuer as the security bought or sold by the
inside trader); Wang, Trading on Material, Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets:
Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1286-87
(1981) (reviewing the effects of trading puts and calls under rule 10b-5); Comment, supra note 2, at
1154-59 (outlining situations in which option traders could have standing to sue under rule lOb-5);
Note, Insiders, Options and the Fiduciary Principle: A Rule lob-5 Loophole, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
295, 321-28 (1988) (discussing insider trading in options); Note, Private Causes of Action for Option
Investors Under SEC Rule l0b-5: A Policy, Doctrinal, and Economic Analysis, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1959, 1959-78 (1987) (discussing private actions for option investors under rule lOb-5); Note, Securi-
ties Regulation for a Changing Market: Option Trader Standing Under Rule lOb-5, 97 YALE L.J.
623, 625-30 (1988) (reviewing option trader cases and standing under rule lOb-5).
17. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
19. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225.
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Reversing Chiarella's conviction, the Court held that to obtain a conviction, the
government must prove more than that the defendant traded securities while in
possession of material, nonpublic information. 20 While the holding was narrow,
the Court's explanation had important implications for the law of insider trad-
ing.2 1 Among other things, the Court's reading of section 10(b) suggested that
the SEC is powerless to forbid corporate insiders from trading standardized op-
tions while in possession of material, nonpublic corporate information. 22
The Court's starting point in Chiarella, as in most of its recent rule 10b-5
cases, was the language of section 10(b).2 3 Section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to
regulate the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.24 Chiarella had not lied to
anyone, and the case turned on the legal effect of his silence.25 The Court held
that silence cannot be deceptive (the Court used the word "fraudulent") within
the meaning of section 10(b) unless the silent party has a duty to speak.26 Be-
cause the trial judge had permitted the jury to convict upon a naked finding that
Chiarella had failed to disclose material, nonpublic information, without regard
to whether he had a duty to disclose that information, the conviction had to be
reversed.27
Although the Court reversed Chiarella's conviction, it indicated that rule
10b-5 and section 10(b) prohibit some insider trading. Specifically, the Court
suggested that someone under a duty to disclose information before consummat-
ing a securities transaction violates the rule and section if she trades before mak-
ing the required disclosure.28 The Court also seemed to accept the SEC's
contention that corporate insiders have a duty to disclose material, nonpublic
corporate information before buying corporate stock, that duty arising from
"the relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corpora-
tion and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of
their position with that corporation."' 29 It follows that when a corporate insider
in possession of material, nonpublic corporate information buys common stock
from a public stockholder without disclosing that information first, she violates
rule lOb-5 and section 10(b).
20. Id. at 235-37.
21. See generally Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1982) (discussing implications of Chiarella).
22. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1137-48.
23. 445 U.S. at 226; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-90 (1980) (the primacy of "the
plain meaning of the language of § 10(b)"); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1977)
(the starting point is the language of § 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)
("turn first to the language of § 10(b)"). In explaining its focus on section 10(b) in an earlier rule
lOb-5 case, the Court said: "The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged
with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is 'the power to
adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.'" Hochfelder,
425 U.S. at 213-14 (citations omitted).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) (1988).
25. 445 U.S. at 226.
26. Id. at 234-35; see also id. at 232.
27. Id. at 235-37.
28. Id. at 227-30.
29. Id. at 228.
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Any insider-trading rule must deal with options. The price of a publicly
traded option to buy or sell common stock moves with the price of the stock.
30
Accordingly, anything that affects the price of stock, including information
about the affairs of its issuer, also will affect the price of options on the stock,
and false or incomplete information about an issuer's affairs that is reflected in
the market price of a security also will be reflected in the price of options on that
security. Thus, someone who perceives a difference between the market price of
a security and its value can trade the security or an option on it, and anyone who
possesses nonpublic information relevant to the value of common stock may find
it more profitable to trade options on the stock than to trade the stock itself.
The legal complication comes from the fact that publicly traded options on
common stock are not issued by the corporations that issue the common stock
underlying the options, but by the Options Clearing Corporation. Because a
public option trader need not be a stockholder of the issuer of the underlying
security, insiders of that issuer may not have any duty to disclose material, in-
side information before trading standardized options. Presumably the disclosure
duty the Court recognized in Chiarella-the fiduciary duty of candor that cor-
porate insiders owe to owners of corporate equity securities with whom they
would trade-does not run to option traders who are not stockholders. To the
extent that liability under rule lob-5 turns on an inside trader's being affiliated
with the issuer of the traded security, an insider who may not trade common
stock legally may be able to trade options on that stock legally. Similarly, if a
trader's standing to challenge insider trading in a private action turns on her
being a stockholder of the corporation with which the insider is affiliated, an
option trader may lack standing to challenge illegal insider trading of options or
stock.
Chiarella did not foreclose the possibility that section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
might be construed to forbid corporate insiders from buying standardized op-
tions on the stock of the companies with which they are affiliated while in pos-
session of material, nonpublic corporate information. The Court declined to
consider the argument that section 10(b) and rule lob-5 require persons who
have misappropriated nonpublic information to disclose that information or re-
frain from trading.31 Nonetheless, even though the text of the statute suggests
that Congress enacted the Exchange Act at least in part because it objected to
corporate insiders' use of inside information for personal profit, 32 the Court's
30. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 469-94 (3d
ed. 1988) (valuation of options).
31. 445 U.S. at 235-37; see also id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Chiarella arguably violated
a duty of silence); id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("a person violates § 10(b)
whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then
uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities"); id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("a
person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that infor-
mation or refrain from trading"); cf. id. at 227 n.8 (traditional insiders owe disclosure duties to
outsiders to whom they sell stock).
32. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988) ("For the purpose
of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him" from short-
swing transactions shall inure to the issuer.). But see Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
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opinion in Chiarella seems to suggest that more than taking advantage of confi-
dential information-specifically, an independent duty of disclosure-is neces-
sary before insider trading is illegal. If the language of section 10(b) really does
limit the SEC to regulating deceptive conduct, any judicial or administrative
extension of the disclose-or-abstain-from-trading rule to insider option trading is
problematic at least. The misappropriation or misuse of confidential informa-
tion may breach duties of confidentiality or secrecy, but such breaches do not
create independent duties of disclosure, and absent such a duty it is difficult to
say that silent trading meets section 10(b)'s threshold requirement that regulated
conduct be deceptive.3 3
In the aftermath of Chiarella, at least some courts held that option traders
did not have standing to challenge insider trading.3 4 By denying option traders
standing, these courts avoided the difficult question of whether insider trading in
options violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 at all. Denying a plaintiff standing
may effectively decide difficult questions of substantive law and obscure the na-
ture of the "underlying rights and interests at stake" in a dispute,35 and in the
area of insider trading, as the comment showed, standing became a term of art in
which analysis of standing and the underlying cause of action merged.
3 6
This was the situation in 1984 when Congress enacted the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act.3 7 Along with the better-known provision that authorized the
SEC to seek civil penalties of up to three times the profit made or loss avoided by
illegal insider trading,38 the Sanctions Act addressed insider trading in options.
Section 20(d) of the Exchange Act now provides that if it is a violation of the
Exchange Act or its rules to trade a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information, then it is a violation to trade options on the security in
the same circumstances.3 9 Section 20(d) also gives option traders a cause of
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 478-85 (1991) (the purpose clause
of § 16(b) was an afterthought that does not reflect congressional intent).
33. See D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 13, at 159-71 (questioning doctrinal validity of misappro-
priation theory); cf. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (tie vote without opinion on
misappropriation theory). Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), can be read to introduce an independ-
ent requirement that there be a breach of some duty of confidentiality before tippees can be held
accountable for trading on inside information, but Chiarella would still seem to require that the
trading tippee be under a duty of disclosure as well.
34. See, ag., Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.) (option trader
lacked standing to challenge corporation's purchase of its own stock without disclosing material
information), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); see also Comment, supra note 2, at 1140 n. 153 (trac-
ing line of cases following Laventhall).
35. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 490-91 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974) (only if statute creates a right of
action need court consider standing).
36. Comment, supra note 2, at 1125, 1131.
37. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.).
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a) (1988).
39. The scant publicly available record of the enactment of § 20(d) suggests that the sponsors
were concerned that without the amendment, insider trading in options might have been legal. See
130 CONG. REc. H7757-58 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell); see also 130 CONG.
REc. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("This provision would make
clear that it is not possible to insulate oneself from the prohibition of insider trading by restricting
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action against insiders who engage in such illegal option trading.w°
Section 20(d) is an important part of the law of insider trading, and to fully
understand the issues the comment discusses, it is important to appreciate how
the section works. Conversely, study of the comment can lead to a better under-
standing of the statute. Reading section 20(d) against the background of the
comment can yield valuable insights into the current state of the law of insider
trading and also into the way statutory law is made and applied, at least in the
field of securities regulation. The comment argued that corporate insiders
should be prohibited from trading options on corporate stock while in possession
of material, nonpublic corporate information, and that public option traders
should be able to recover from insiders who trade options in such circumstances.
These propositions are fairly disputable, but most people probably would agree
with them. Insider trading in stock options probably provokes public antipathy
just as much as (and perhaps more than) insider trading in corporate stock, and
as soon as it was apparent that insider trading in options might not be illegal
Congress stepped in to make sure that it would be.
If the Supreme Court held insider trading in options and other forms of
trading on nonpublic information to be outside the scope of rule lOb-5 in
Chiarella, it was not because it found such trading unobjectionable. The Court
simply found that the language of section 10(b) does not permit the SEC to
address those concerns. "We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without rec-
ognizing a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad
duty ... should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congres-
sional intent."'4 1
Clearly Congress was not satisfied entirely with the limited prohibition of
insider trading indicated by the Supreme Court's approach to interpreting sec-
tion 10(b). 42 With section 20(d), Congress provided very explicit evidence that
corporate insiders' duty to disclose information is broader than the duty the
Court was prepared to recognize in Chiarella.4 3 After 1984, one might have
asked whether the congressional dissatisfaction evident in section 20(d) was suf-
ficiently explicit to justify regulation of types of insider trading law that Con-
gress did not expressly address (insider trading in debt instruments, for
example). The explicit evidence of section 20(d) may go only to insider trading
in options, but section 20(d) may reflect objections to insider trading that are
activity to securities that are derivative of the securities to which the material, nonpublic information
relates.").
40. The parameters of an option trader's cause of action are discussed in Crespi, supra note 16;
Wang, A Cause of Action, supra note 16; and Wang, supra note 11, at 1187-91.
41. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (citation omitted).
42. See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 1290-91 ("[While the drafters [of the Sanctions Act]
were prepared to recognize and ratify the Supreme Court's approach in construing current law, they
believed that from a policy standpoint it can result in too narrow a prohibition."); see also D.
LANGEVOORT, supra note 13, at 63 n.59.
43. Cf. D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 13, at 62-64 (substantive implications of Congress's failure
to change substantive law of insider trading); Langevoort, supra note 16, at 1290 ("[T]he statutory
change is effectively a statement that the disclosure obligation should exist, in some cases at least,
absent any preexisting fiduciary duty.").
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much broader than those the Supreme Court acknowledged in Chiarella. Con-
gress had little reason to make insider trading in options illegal if it felt that
insider trading is objectionable only when it violates a duty of candor owed to
corporate security holders. The decision to forbid some insider options trading
suggests that Congress was concerned with something other than candor. Sec-
tion 20(d) may have responded to the considerations of fairness and propriety
that the comment cited in support of giving option traders standing to challenge
insider trading, and those considerations justify a broader proscription of insider
trading than can survive Chiarella.
Section 20(d) may have responded to more parochial interests of course,4 4
and whatever moved Congress, it always is difficult to justify changing law Con-
gress did not address on the basis of policies thought to underlie laws it did
make. In any event, the substantive content of the Sanctions Act may be pri-
marily a matter of historical interest now. The enactment of the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA)45 reduced the practi-
cal importance of the question of whether the Sanctions Act made implicit
changes in the substantive law of insider trading. The 1988 Act did address
expressly the substantive law of insider trading, employing some remarkable
statutory devices in the process. Not the least of these were enacted congres-
sional findings that the SEC's rules governing trading while in possession of ma-
terial, nonpublic information are appropriate and have been enforced effectively
and fairly within the limits of accepted administrative and judicial
construction. 46
Although there may no longer be any reason to try to read the entrails of
the Sanctions Act to understand the securities laws, the fact that section 20(d)
did have substantive implications is important. With the proliferation of statu-
tory law, many commentators have given up on the possibility of Congress keep-
ing its laws current.47 Congress delegated broad powers to the SEC in section
10(b) of the Exchange Act in an attempt to avoid statutory rigidity and obsoles-
44. It is somewhat puzzling that the government puts so much energy into fighting insider
trading. Insider trading may be harmful, but whatever harm it does is not compelling. The explana.
tion may lie in a widely shared sense that insider trading is unfair. See Langevoort, Investment
Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REv. 1023, 1046-50 (1990). Proscription also
serves the particular interests of various people involved in the securities market. For example, those
who are next in line to get confidential information may favor a rule forbidding those in front of
them to trade. See Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L. REV.
1449, 1451-52 (1987). The SEC also benefits from regulating insider trading under rule l0b-5. In-
sider trading is widely considered to be unfair, and the SEC may find it attractive to focus its re-
sources on insider trading instead of more complicated initiatives that may injure politically
powerful interests. Thus the SEC increasingly emphasized insider trading cases in the early 1980s at
the same time it turned away from more controversial pursuit of management malfeasance.
45. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
46. Id § 2 (codified as an appendix to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988)). See generally Friedman,
supra note 10 (explaining "hidden" changes effected by ITSFEA); Kaswell, An Insider's View of the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145 (1989) (discussing
ITSFEA).
47. See, eg., G. CALABARESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7 (1982) (describ-
ing courts' responses to legislatures' incapacity to keep statutes up to date).
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cence, but by the mid-1980s, section 10(b) itself seemed to be ossifying.48 Al-
most immediately, however, Congress responded to judicial interpretations of
section 10(b) with which it could not agree. That response lies in the hidden
substance of the 1984 and 1988 insider trading statutes.
The way Congress responded also is interesting. An increasingly popular
argument in favor of courts' interpreting statutes literally is that by doing so
they will encourage Congress to express itself clearly, which is thought to be a
good thing. For whatever reason, the Supreme Court has tried to interpret sec-
tion 10(b) literally,49 employing what Justice Blackmun has disparaged as "tech-
nical linguistic analysis."50 Congress has responded to the Court's literal (and
narrow) reading of section 10(b) in both the Sanctions Act and the 1988 Act, but
not in the way that might have been predicted. Neither response is anything like
a clear statement. Perhaps the result of Congress's approach will be continued
evolution of the substantive law of insider trading as the Court and the SEC
respond in turn. The process should continue to be interesting.
48. See Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 385, 461-64 (1990).
49. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also Thel, supra note 48, at 386-88 (Supreme
Court's approach to § 10(b)).
50. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 715 (1980) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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